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CASE COMMENTS
Ad Valorem Taxation-AGRICULTURAL CLASSIFICATIONS-THE CON-
TINUING PREFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT ACCORDED THE FLORIDA LAND
SPECULATOR-Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 368 So. 2d
588 (Fla. 1978).
K & K Land Management, Inc. (K & K), a corporation organized
under the laws of Florida and authorized to do business in Florida,
purchased approximately 575 acres of land in December 1972. Most
of the land in question had been farmed as an orange grove for
approximately twenty years prior to the purchase. Approximately
twenty-five acres of the property werodeveloped into an amusement
park known as Circus World, while the remainder of the land was
held for future development.' Heller Brothers Packing Co. main-
tained this undeveloped portion as an orange grove.' They sprayed,
cultivated, disced, and pruned, and twice a year fertilized the prop-
erty. However, the property was not irrigated and there had been
no replanting or resetting of trees.3 Heller Brothers paid K & K a
flat fee of $40,000 per year.'
K & K purchased the property for approximately $5,500,000, or
$9,000 per acre.5 This price was roughly six times the assessed agri-
cultural value of the property,' and therefore triggered the mechan-
ics of section 193.461(4)(c), Florida Statutes.7 Pursuant to this
1. Brief of Appellants at 4, Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla.
1978). The land was located near Interstate 4 and Highway 27. Appellant's brief states that
the property was purchased for the ultimate development of a large family entertainment
park. K & K, a wholly owned subsidiary of Circus World admits this, but claims there are
no present plans for development of the land.
2. Id. at 5. Heller Brothers Packing is a company from Winter Garden, Florida, that
packages produce and manages orange groves for other people.
3. Respondent's Brief on the Merits Subsequent to Order Allowing Certiorari at 6. K &
K claimed that no replanting or resetting was done because there were nematodes in the grove
and K & K was attempting to establish the boundaries of the infestation. Mr. Kazaros, the
main witness for respondent and an employee of Heller Brothers, also claimed that the
company did not take less care of this property than any other citrus property they were
managing.
4. Id. at 4. When the property was initially purchased the actual arrangement was for K
& K and Heller Brothers to split the net proceeds, after expenses, from the sale of the crops
with 40% going to K & K and 60% going to Heller Brothers. The land was never under lease.
5. Brief of Appellants at 4.
6. Id. at 6. The agriculturally assessed value of the property was approximately $1,600
per acre.
7. (1977). Section 193.461(4)(c) provides:
Sale of land for a purchase price which is three or more times the agricultural
assessment placed on the land shall create a presumption that such land is not used
primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes. Upon a showing of special circum-
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subsection, if property is purchased for over three times its agricul-
turally assessed value, a presumption arises that the property is no
longer being held for bona fide agricultural purposes; therefore, un-
less the presumption is rebutted by the landowner, the property
would not be entitled to the preferential tax treatment of an assess-
ment below just value under the greenbelt law'-an agricultural
classification.
James Roden, Tax Assessor of Polk County, denied K & K an
agricultural classification on its property since the purchase price
for a strictly commercial grove operation would have been no more
than $3,000 per acre.' Roden believed the large premium paid by K
& K was indicative of an intent not to use the property for a good
faith commercial agricultural purpose, but rather to hold the prop-
erty for speculative reasons. Roden also noted that in view of the
purchase price of the property there could be no reasonable expecta-
tion of K & K making the agricultural enterprise profitable either
at that time or in the near future.'" Roden concluded that the statu-
tory three times presumption was not rebutted as there was no bona
fide agricultural use of the property. Consequently, preferential tax
treatment was denied. K & K challenged this denial and the circuit
court declared the statute unconstitutional." The Florida Supreme
Court reversed this decision and found the three times presumption
to be constitutional. 2
After the constitutional issue had been decided by the supreme
court and the case had been remanded to the circuit court for a final
determination on the merits, the circuit court held that the lands
in question were being used primarily for bona fide agricultural
purposes as defined in subsection (3)(b) of the greenbelt law. Con-
stances by the landowner demonstrating that the land is to be continued in bona
fide agriculture, this presumption may be rebutted.
8. FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (1977).
9. Brief of Appellants at 6.
10. Id. at 5. K & K had mortgaged the property for approximately $3,000,000. At an
interest rate of 6%, K & K's annual interest payment of $180,000 far exceeded the $40,000 in
annual revenue from the property.
11. K & K Land Management, Inc. v. Roden, No. GC-G-73-1905 (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. Oct.
3, 1974), rev'd sub nom. Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 326 So. 2d 421 (Fla.
1976). In separate actions K & K had challenged both the 1973 and 1974 tax assessments.
Both cases were initially styled K & K Land Management, Inc. v. Roden. In appealing the
1973 decision, the Department of Revenue inadvertently styled the case Straughn v. K & K
Land Management, Inc. When the two cases were subsequently consolidated for determina-
tion on the merits by the supreme court, the case was styled Roden v. K & K Land Manage-
ment, Inc.
12. Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 326 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1976).
13. K & K Land Management, Inc. v. Roden, No. GC-G-73-1905 (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. May
3, 1976), aff'd sub nom. Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 342 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), aff'd sub nom. Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 368 So. 2d
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sequently, such lands were qualified for an agricultural classifica-
tion and thus entitled to preferential tax treatment. Roden subse-
quently appealed this decision to the Second District Court of Ap-
peal of Florida. The second district affirmed the circuit court's deci-
sion without opinion. 4 In reaching the same decision in a second
case, the second district stated that agricultural use of land alone
was sufficient to entitle K & K to an agricultural classification.,5
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower
courts.' 6
Prior to 1972, the greenbelt law did not contain the three times
presumption or the definition of bona fide agricultural use as a good
faith commercial agricultural use. 7 At that time, even if land had
been purchased for speculative purposes and no profit could be
realized from the agriculture, the landowner could still receive the
preferential tax treatment of an agricultural classification since the
only requirement was an agricultural use of the property.' Conse-
588 (Fla. 1978). FLA. STAT. § 193.461(3)(b)(1977) provides:
Subject to the restrictions set out in this section, only lands which are used
primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be classified agricultural. "Bona
fide agricultural purposes" means good faith commercial agricultural use of the
land. In determining whether the use of the land for agricultural purposes is bona
fide, the following factors may be taken into consideration:
1. The length of time the land has been so utilized;
2. Whether the use has been continuous;
3. The purchase price paid;
4. Size, as it relates to specific agricultural use;
5. Whether an indicated effort has been made to care sufficiently and ade-
quately for the land in accordance with accepted commercial agricultural practices,
including, without limitation, fertilizing, liming, tilling, mowing, reforesting, and
other accepted agricultural practices;
6. Whether such land is under lease and, if so, the effective length, terms, and
conditions of the lease; and
7. Such other factors as may from time to time become applicable.
14. Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 342 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1977), aff'd sub nom. Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1978).
15. Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 347 So. 2d 724, 726 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977), aff'd sub nor. Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla.
1978).
16. Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc., 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1978).
17. Ch. 72-181, § 1, 1972 Fla. Laws 571 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 193.461(4)(c)
(1977)) did not apply to ad valorem assessments until after December 31, 1972. After the
passage of the 1972 amendments, which added the three times presumption and the definition
of bona fide agricultural use as a good faith commercial agricultural use to the greenbelt law,
several district court decisions required a reasonable expectation of a profitable agricultural
enterprise before an agricultural classification could be granted. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank
v. Markham, 342 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Markham v. Nationwide Dev.
Co., 349 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The second district in Straughn held that
use was still the determinative factor in acquiring preferential tax treatment. This created
the conflict which allowed the Supreme Court of Florida to take jurisdiction in Roden.
18. See, e.g., Conrad v. Sapp, 252 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971); Greenwood v. Oates, 251 So. 2d
665 (Fla. 1971).
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quently, many land speculators were able to acquire the preferential
tax treatment of an agricultural classification. The 1972 amend-
ment to the greenbelt law created the confusion that has culminated
in Roden v. K & K Land Management, Inc. This law added the
three times presumption and the definition of bona fide agricultural
use to the greenbelt law making it more difficult to qualify for an
agricultural classification. The definition lists criteria that should
be examined in deciding if land has a bona fide agricultural use, and
the three times presumption puts up a red flag to the granting of
an agricultural classification. Because the greenbelt law, prior to
1972, was such a favorable tax shelter for land speculators, the
amendments to the statute seem to be an attempt by the legislature
to narrow the scope of agricultural classifications, thereby prevent-
ing abuse of the statute by speculators. 9
The passage of these amendments to the greenbelt law also
prompted the promulgation of rule 12D-5.01, Florida Administra-
tive Code.20 This rule requires that there be a reasonable expectation
19. A memorandum of the House of Representatives Committee on Finance and Taxa-
tion, the committee that wrote chapter 72-181, explains the intent of the amendments. Al-
though this memorandum was written in January of 1978, it does have some probative value
since it was written to counteract apparent efforts to lobby against this statute. The memo-
randum states:
The law was also designed to prevent persons from purchasing lands for speculative
purpsoes [sic], either wholely [sic] or partially, and receiving special tax treat-
ment through a temporary or short term farming operation.
There is no distinction between a bona fide commercial agricultural opera-
tion and an agricultural operation which earns a fair return on investment. The
absence of a fair return indicates that the owner has invested in the property for
reasons beyond or supplemental to farming. . . . It is by virture [sic] of the future
speculative return on the land investment that a person can continue farming
without a fair return. Going through the motions of farming is insufficient grounds
to qualify for greenbelt assessment under current law. The Department's rule [Rule
12D-5.01, Florida Administrative Code] does not go beyond the law, but properly
impliments [sic] it.
It is evident, then, that most of Florida's agricultural land, bona fide or otherwise,
is assessed at unrealistically low levels. Because assessments are so low, many of
the sales of land for even bona fide agricultural purposes exceed three times the
assessment.
. . Because a bona fide commercial agricultural operation will always be eligi-
ble for agricultural classification under current law, the three-times-value presump-
tion is merely a mechanism for reviewing the accuracy of agricultural assessments.
Fla. H.R., Committee on Finance and Taxation, Staff Analysis at 6-10 (Jan. 1978 (emphasis
in original).
20. Rule 12D-5.01(2) states:
Good faith commercial agricultural use of property is defined as the pursuit of
an agricultural activity for a reasonable profit or at least upon a reasonable expecta-
tion of meeting investment cost and realizing a reasonable profit. The profit or
reasonable expectation thereof must be viewed from the standpoint of the fee owner
and measured in light of his investment.
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of meeting the expenses of the property and making a profit from
the agriculture before there can be a good faith commercial agricul-
tural use of property. This rule appears to complement the intent
of the amendments. However, the decision in Roden appears to
directly oppose the logic of the statutory changes and the promul-
gation of this rule.
The issue in Roden, as stated by the supreme court, was whether
more than mere use was necessary to establish a bona fide agricul-
tural operation for purposes of preferential tax treatment.2 In direct
opposition to the apparent legislative intent behind the 1972
amendments to the greenbelt law and rule 12D-5.01, the court held
that use was, and should be, the overriding consideration in classify-
ing land for agricultural purposes;22 therefore, the three times pre-
sumption had been rebutted in this case.
To support the decision in Roden, the supreme court relied on its
prior decision in Straughn v. Tuck.23 However, such reliance seems
to be inappropriate. The issue presented for decision in Tuck was
confined solely to the question of whether the physical state of the
taxpayer's land, rather than active "use" to some degree for agricul-
tural purposes, was the test for agricultural classification under arti-
cle VII, section 4, Florida Constitution and section 193.461(3)(b),
Florida Statutes.2 ' The property in question in Tuck was in its natu-
ral state with no evidence of any type of farming operations.2 5 The
supreme court stated that use was still the guidepost in classifying
land 2 and, since the land in Tuck was not being used for any agri-
cultural purpose, the agricultural classification was not allowed. 27
When confined to the issue of whether there must be some degree
of agricultural use of the land in order to receive an agricultural
classification, Straughn v. Tuck is a correct statement of the law.
However, the decision in Tuck should not be considered as authority
to resolve the additional question presented in Roden of whether
there must be something more than mere physical agricultural use. 28
The question of whether the legislature may define the nature of
the use required for agricultural classification to be more than
merely physical agricultural activity had been decided by the su-
preme court prior to Tuck in Straughn v. K & K Land Management,
21. Roden, 368 So. 2d at 589.
22. Id.
23. 354 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1977).
24. Id. at 370.
25. Id. at 371.
26. Id. at 370.
27. Id. at 372.
28. Roden, 368 So. 2d at 589.
1979
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Inc.29 The court in Straughn held the three times presumption con-
tained in section 193.461(4)(c) constitutional because it affected
only the classification of property, not its assessment .3 Therefore,
even though the Florida Constitution requires that land be assessed
solely on the basis of character or use, 3' section 193.461, Florida
Statutes, relates solely to agricultural classification of property and
not assessment. The legislature is constitutionally empowered to
restrict the classification criteria to more stringent standards than
mere physical use of the land.3 2 ,The supreme court thus has ex-
pressly upheld the right of the legislature to define land for purposes
of agricultural classification as something more than land merely
devoted to physical agricultural activity. Specifically, it has upheld
the right of the legislature to limit the definition of agricultural land
to land devoted to good faith commercial agricultural use of the
land. In determining whether land is in fact being used for bona fide
agricultural purposes, the court in Straughn held that other factors
listed in section 193.461(3)(b) can be taken into consideration."
The court in Straughn also recognized the nexus between invest-
ment price and expected return from agricultural activities inherent
in the concept of commercial agricultural use.34 The statutorily cre-
ated three times presumption was found to be rational in Straughn
because land purchased for three times its assessed value could not
be considered as being put to a good faith commercial agricultural
use since the purchaser could not expect an annual return from
agricultural activities sufficient to meet investment costs and return
a profit similar to that which an investor could expect from other
commercial enterprises with similar risks, liquidity, degree and
level of management.3 5 Following Straughn, several appellate courts
in Florida have stated that entitlement to agricultural classification
29. 326 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1976).
30. The supreme court addressed the constitutional challenge and held:
Nor are we persuaded that the challenged statute is unconstitutional under Arti-
cle VII, section 4(a), Florida Constitution, which provides that "agricultural land
or land used exclusively for non-commercial recreational purposes may be classified
by general law and assessed solely on the basis of character or use." It is alleged
that the statutory presumption impinges upon the nature of the assessment author-
ized by the Constitution. We conclude, however, that the challenged statutory
language affects only the classification of purportedly agricultural property, not its
assessment.
Id. at 424 (emphasis in original).
31. FLA. CONsT. art VII, § 4(a) provides that "[aigricultural land or land used exclusively
for non-commercial recreational purposes may be classified by general law and assessed solely
on the basis of character or use." (emphasis added).
32. See Straughn, 326 So. 2d at 424.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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depends upon more than mere physical agricultural activity on the
land .3 These courts recognize that good faith commercial agricul-
tural use is the test under current statutory law, and that this test
requires "at least a reasonable expectation of meeting investment
cost and realizing a reasonable profit. '37
The holding in Tuck that use is still determinative, and the hold-
ing in Straughn that use does not have to be the sole basis for an
agricultural tax classification, can be reconciled. However, when
these cases are made logically consistent, the decision reached in
Roden is incorrect. In Tuck there was absolutely no agricultural use
of the property. This was held to be a sufficient basis to deny the
agricultural classification. 38 The supreme court stated in Tuck that
use was the guidepost and determinative in classifying land. 3 When
these statements are analyzed in context with the facts of the case,
it becomes apparent that some degree of agricultural use of property
is necessary before an agricultural classification can be granted.
Land in its natural state is simply not a sufficient agricultural use.
Because Straughn holds that use does not have to be the sole basis
for agricultural classifications, and is cited in Roden as a correct
statement of the law, it is rational to conclude that other factors can
be examined when determining if an agricultural classification is
warranted." If other factors can be examined, as stated in Straughn,
the issue then becomes the degree of active agricultural use that is
necessary to entitle land to an agricultural classification.
The three times presumption was considered rational in Straughn
because a fair return from the agricultural activity could not be
made in light of the high purchase price; therefore, it is logical to
conclude that a rebuttal of the presumption would require at least
some showing of a future expectation of a fair return. Although in
Tuck the supreme court stated that agricultural classifications
could not be limited to profitable enterprises,4' there was no showing
by K & K that there would ever be any chance of them earning a
fair return on their investment from the agriculture. 2 In fact, the
36. See, e.g., Markham v. Nationwide Dev. Co., 349 So. 2d 220, (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977); First Nat'l Bank v. Markham, 342 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The
Florida Supreme Court in Roden disapproved of Nationwide but did not expressly overrule
it.
37. Markham v. Nationwide Dev. Co., 349 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
38. Tuck, 354 So. 2d at 371.
39. Id. at 370.
40. See Straughn, 326 So. 2d at 424.
41. 354 So. 2d at 371.
42. Brief of Appellants at 14. The Department of Revenue was not trying to limit agricul-
tural classifications strictly to profitable enterprises. All the Department wanted, which K
& K could not and did not show, was evidence that from all the circumstances there was at
1979]
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purchase price was so high that the return K & K was receiving was
not sufficient to defray even one quarter of the interest expense from
the mortgage on the property.43 This, coupled with the fact that K
& K admitted that it was planning on developing the property in
the future,4 seems to logically dictate that K & K's degree of active
agricultural use of the property was not sufficient to call it a bona
fide agricultural operation. Since there was no proof that K & K
could make a fair return from the farming activities either at that
time or in the future, the agricultural use appears to be nothing
more than a method of defraying the costs of holding the property
until a future speculative return could be realized. The lower tax
assessment allows K & K to further minimize the holding cost of the
property.
In Tuck the supreme court held that the tax assessor could assign
appropriate weights to the different factors used in arriving at a just
value for the assessment of property. 5 It would be totally consistent
with Tuck, therefore, to allow the assignment of weights to the
different factors used in classifying land. The above economic fac-
tors seriously contradict the conclusion that the property had a bona
fide agricultural use, especially when the rational intent behind the
three time presumption is considered. It is only logical that these
factors should be weighted more heavily by the tax assessor than the
simple actual agricultural use of the property. If use is the guidepost
but not the sole basis for an agricultural classification, which the
supreme court in Roden held to be the correct statement of the law,
the above analysis of the decisions in Tuck and Straughn logically
dictates that the opposite result should have been reached in Roden.
The degree of actual agricultural use was simply not sufficient to
overcome the presumption against a bona fide agricultural use in
light of the overwhelming economic factors. By allowing K & K the
preferential tax treatment of an agricultural classification under
these facts, the supreme court has put an overpowering emphasis on
simple agricultural use when resolving whether an agricultural clas-
sification should be granted for property.
The state of the law in this area has been further confused by the
court's failure in Roden to overrule Markham v. Nationwide Devel-
opment Co." It is impossible to reconcile Nationwide with Roden,
least a reasonable expectation of making a fair return in the future. Consequently, the De-
partment's position was not contrary to the holding in Tuck.
43. Brief of Appellants at 5.
44. Id. at 4.
45. 354 So. 2d at 371.
46. 349 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). It should be noted that there was a strong
dissent in Roden authored by Justice Alderman and concurred in by Justices England and
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since Nationwide squarely held that more than mere agricultural
use was necessary to entitle land to an agricultural classification
and that there must be some showing of a reasonable expectation
of meeting investment costs and realizing a reasonable profit.47
By upholding the district court, the supreme court has sanctioned
the tax shelter which the legislature was trying to remove from the
greenbelt law by the passage of the 1972 amendments. The district
court stated that agriculture could be used to help carry the costs
of the land or reduce the investment until such time as the full
speculative profits could be realized. The court also stated that
actual use was all that was necessary to acquire an agricultural
classification.' 8 This decision seems to conflict with the logical pur-
pose behind the 1972 amendments to the greenbelt law; however,
the supreme court has affirmed it as the correct statement of the
law. By holding as it did, the supreme court has left the way open
for land speculators to continue acquiring preferential tax treatment
by simply using the property for agricultural purposes. This not only
appears to be contrary to the intent behind the 1972 amendments,
but it also allows land speculators to reap huge profits on the sale
of land, as holding costs are minimal. Because the land speculators
are not paying their proportionate share of taxes, the tax burden is
shifted to the rest of the community. This is an untenable result.
Perhaps one of the reasons the supreme court held as it did was
the lack of hard rebuttal of K & K's contentions concerning the
seven criteria listed in the greenbelt law for deciding whether there
is a bona fide agricultural use.4" The Department of Revenue's posi-
tion, supported by several district court decisions, was that profit
motive was the deciding factor, and it did tend to overlook the other
aspects of the greenbelt law.50 The Department of Revenue must
have felt that the purpose of the 1972 amendments to the greenbelt
law was so obvious that it needed only to stress the economic factors
Sundberg which cited Nationwide as the correct statement of the law. These justices felt that
since there was no showing by K & K that it paid less than six times the agriculturally
assessed value of the grove and no proof that K & K had a reasonable expectation of meeting
investment costs and making a reasonable profit from the agriculture, the facts could not
sustain a holding that the three times presumption was rebutted. They felt that to hold
otherwise would unfairly shift the tax burden from K & K to the overall community. Roden,
368 So. 2d at 590.
47. 349 So. 2d at 222.
48. Straughn, 347 So. 2d at 726. The second district's decision in this case appears to be
somewhat in conflict with its decision in Walden v. Tuten, 347 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977). In Walden the district court remanded the case for the lower court to consider
the commercial use aspect. It seemed the district court put more emphasis on commercial
agricultural use in Walden than in its decision in Straughn.
49. FLA. STAT. § 193.46(3)(b) (1977).
50. Brief of Appellants at 4-16.
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in order to prevail. Another possible reason for the decision could
be the absence of amicus curiae briefs filed on behalf of the Depart-
ment of Revenue. If several cities and counties had submitted such
briefs supporting the Department of Revenue's position and ex-
plaining the impact of an adverse ruling, the supreme court may
have ruled differently. Amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of
K & K by large landowning companies and may have been enough
to persuade the court that K & K's interest was more substantial
than that of the Department of Revenue.5
Since the law in this area still needs clarification, the supreme
court may decide to distinguish future cases on the facts and hold
differently if its opinion on the greenbelt law is changed. After the
decision in Roden, it appears that the law has come full circle since
the passage of the 1972 amendments to the greenbelt law. Actual
agricultural use was and still is the test for acquiring the preferential
tax treatment of an agricultural classification. Consequently, the
three times presumption, along with the restrictive definition of
bona fide agricultural use, has been rendered ineffective in the fight
against speculator abuse of the greenbelt law.
JAMES H. BURGESS, JR.
51. Amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of K & K by First Mississippi Corporation
and CF Mining Corporation.
